I. INTRODUCTION
T he level of the small business exemption threshold is one of the most important decisions that policymakers must make when adopting a value-added tax (VAT). Businesses that fall below the small business exemption threshold (hereafter referred to as the "threshold") are not required to collect VAT, drastically affecting the burden of the tax. In this paper we use a database of tax returns developed by Knittel et al. (2011) and the theoretical framework developed by Keen and Mintz (2004) to determine the optimal threshold for a VAT in the United States. We believe this is the frst published measurement of the optimal threshold for the United States based on individual frm data.
The primary argument for having a threshold is that collection costs (the private costs of collecting and remitting the tax and the public costs of administering the tax) can be reduced without giving up signifcant tax revenue. Small businesses, defned as those businesses under the threshold, are typically not required to issue VAT invoices and fle a VAT return. This signifcantly reduces the number of returns fled and thus lowers the administrative costs of the VAT. In addition, business compliance costs are generally considered to be regressive with respect to tax revenue, which means that the frms which must comply with VAT recordkeeping are those most able to handle the additional costs. Finally, without a threshold many small businesses receive refunds or pay little VAT so that exempting small businesses may even raise net revenue. For example, businesses temporarily in a loss position or startup businesses with low taxable sales but signifcant purchases may have negative value-added and be owed a refund.
The theoretical framework developed by Keen and Mintz characterizes the optimal threshold by accounting for the trade-off between tax revenues and collection costs. While estimates of the optimal threshold in other countries can rely on data for current VAT flers, the United States does not have a VAT, so we instead estimate the VAT base for each business from income tax flings. We assume that all business types may potentially be required to fle a VAT return. We use tax data to estimate taxable sales, purchases, compliance costs, and administrative costs for each business. Exports are imputed from the input-output tables. This allows us to empirically estimate, using a static model of the U.S. economy, the optimal level of the threshold in the United States. We also use these data to characterize the extent to which we expect frms to adjust their sales to fall below the threshold and to voluntarily register to pay VAT when they are exempt.
Our major fnding is that the optimal threshold for a 10 percent VAT in the United States is approximately $200,000, which is the 90 th percentile of the size distribution of businesses. Approximately 43 million businesses are below the threshold, and 12.6 million of those have negative value added.
1
The net value added below the threshold is -$145 billion, so in the absence of a signifcant response by frms, setting the threshold at $200,000 would increase net revenues for the government. The total reduction in administrative and compliance costs resulting from a $200,000 threshold is $2.6 billion and $25.5 billion respectively. We also fnd that approximately 0.9 million businesses have an incentive to reduce their taxable sales to fall under the threshold, while eight million businesses below the threshold have an incentive to voluntarily register for the VAT.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF HOW A VAT WORKS
For the standard destination-based credit-invoice VAT, a business calculates its tax liability as its taxable sales times the tax rate, less its input tax credits, which can be calculated as purchases of inputs (including purchases of capital goods but excluding labor costs such as wages and salaries) times the tax rate. 2 The VAT that is paid on the purchase of inputs to the production of exported goods and services is also credited. The business remits the net amount of tax collected on its sales less the input tax credits. As described in the literature (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984; McLure, 1987; Congressional Budget Offce,1992) , the credit-invoice VAT has the advantage that multiple tax rates, including a zero rate, are easier to handle correctly than with the subtraction method. Almost all countries use a credit-invoice VAT so it is likely that, in practice, the United States would also adopt a credit-invoice VAT. However, because we cannot distinguish sales to registered businesses from sales to consumers and unregistered businesses, in this paper we measure the VAT base for each business as taxable sales less purchases, including those from exempt small businesses.
For the credit-invoice method VAT, there are two ways in which the value added for goods and services can be excluded from the tax base: zero rating and exemption. 3 Zero rating completely removes tax from the good or service by taxing the sales at a zero rate while still allowing a credit for the tax paid on inputs. Exports are zero rated under a destination-based credit-invoice VAT. Exemption is similar to zero-rating in that the sales price of the good or service has a zero VAT rate. However, some VAT is implicitly paid on exempted goods and services since producers cannot claim a credit for the VAT they have paid on their inputs. A key difference for collection cost purposes between zero rating and exemption is that exempt businesses do not have to fle VAT returns while zero-rated businesses do have to fle. In addition, businesses selling both taxed and exempt supplies must apportion their input tax credits while businesses selling both taxed and zero rated supplies do not need to apportion credits.
The impact of zero rating and exemption on tax revenues depends upon whether the sale is to another business as an intermediate purchase or to a consumer as a fnal sale. When a zero-rated good or service is sold to another business and thus taxed at a subsequent stage of the production process, zero rating will not impact VAT revenues. In contrast, when an exempt good or service is sold to another business, the exemption will increase VAT revenue as the loss of input tax credits results in the collection of taxes on both all prior value added and all prior taxes at the time that the good or service is sold to the next business. This multiple application of tax is known as cascading. When the sale of the good or service is to the fnal consumer or non-registered business, zero rating will reduce tax revenues to zero, whereas exemption will simply reduce the effective tax rate on the fnal sale. The small business threshold provides an exemption for those sales made by frms below the threshold.
High collection costs relative to the tax revenues collected cause most countries to exempt small businesses from the VAT. Under the credit-invoice method, small businesses with taxable sales below a threshold are typically not required to fle a return. Prices for goods sold by such small businesses incorporate the VAT only to the extent that VAT is included in the price of inputs purchased by untaxed businesses from VATpaying businesses. If the exempt business sells to a taxable business, then the purchasing business does not receive input credits for VAT paid at the prior stage of production. Given this effect, if there is optional registration, small businesses selling predominantly to taxable businesses are more likely to voluntarily register for the VAT.
While the tax base for a VAT is often modeled as total domestic consumption, the base may in fact be different. 4 Hard-to-tax goods and services, such as fnancial intermediation where payment is the difference between the interest received and paid, are often exempted. Similarly, goods and services with public good characteristics provided by governments and non-proft organizations are often zero rated or exempted. Often, the entire sector producing such goods is zero rated or exempted. However, concern about a level playing feld can result in the taxation of certain government and non-proft activities that compete with the private sector. Finally, taxing the value of owner occupied residential housing services would bring many taxpayers into the VAT system that would not otherwise register and collect the VAT. In order to avoid that result many countries tax only the sale of new owner-occupied housing and renovations.
Our modeling approach allows relatively broad tax base adjustments. We do not include governments and non-proft organizations as taxpayers. We include fnancial services where there are separate charges, such as bank deposit fees and property and casualty insurance, while excluding most margin-based fnancial services, such as deposit and lending activities and life insurance. Not including government and non-proft organizations as taxpayers and excluding bank margins and life insurance from the tax base amounts to treating such sales as exempt from the VAT. The service fows from tenant-occupied dwellings are taxed in our model regardless of ownership while the existing stock of owner occupied housing falls entirely outside our tax base. However, most new owner occupied housing, renovations and repairs are taxed in our model as a result of the inclusion of the construction industry in our database.
III. VAT THRESHOLDS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Most of the recent proposals for a VAT in the United States do not discuss a small business exemption, let alone the more complex treatment of small businesses in many countries.
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In particular, the small business registration threshold may differ from the threshold for collection of VAT. Smaller businesses that pay VAT may have options to pay using a simplifed system, to use cash accounting, and to fle and pay less frequently (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2009). The simplifed schemes tend to base VAT remittance on sales alone, and may have different tax rates and thresholds that vary by business sector. Furthermore, countries vary in terms of the minimum registration period. Approximately one-half of the OECD countries require businesses to register for at least one year to fve years (OECD, 2008) . This limits businesses from registering just to receive refunds, such as for the payment period in which they purchase equipment. 6 As shown in Table 1 , we can divide the OECD member countries into three groups based on thresholds.
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• The six countries with the highest thresholds all have thresholds that exceed $63,000,
• The 18 countries have thresholds that vary from $2,000 to $45,000, and
• Five countries have no general threshold.
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Even if a business is below the threshold, most countries allow businesses the option of registering and collecting the VAT. This enables small businesses that primarily sell to other businesses to pay VAT so that there is no tax cascading. Surprisingly, there does not appear to be a clear correlation between the threshold and the percentage of voluntary registrants. An OECD study (2009) noted that the percentage of voluntary registrants did not increase with the threshold for a sample of countries.
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In addition to these general thresholds, other thresholds may apply for certain sectors. In particular, the taxable sales thresholds for service suppliers in France ($30,963), Ireland ($31,537), and Greece ($5,734) are lower than for non-service providers. Similarly, the non-proft and charitable sector has higher thresholds in Australia ($70,922), Switzerland ($88,325), Canada ($41,667), and Norway ($15,748) . Special thresholds apply for the sale of artwork (Denmark), lawyers, writers, and artists (France), and certain small retailers (Portugal) (OECD, 2011) . Note that this special treatment is in addition to reduced rates or exemption for specifc goods and services.
However, the VAT thresholds in Table 1 by themselves do not provide much information about how many businesses are exempted or the revenue forgone by having a specifc threshold. Estimating the effect of the threshold requires further information on the distribution of businesses, which is often diffcult to obtain. Based on information from the United Kingdom (Offce for National Statistics (2010), Figure 1 shows that 6 Refunds are payments from the government to businesses with negative value added and are discussed in more detail in Section VI.C.2. 7 Conversion to U.S. dollars is done using the OECD's purchasing power parities (PPP) rates in order for the numbers to match those in (OECD, 2008) . Unlike currency exchange rates that refect short term events, the PPP refects longer run relationships. The thresholds presented in the table are not necessarily the most recent thresholds for each country, but rather the threshold as of January 2007. This is done for consistency since our U.S. data are also from 2007. 8 These thresholds cannot be directly compared to the U.S. threshold calculated in this paper. For instance, the statutory VAT rates in these countries range from 5 to 25 percent, while we will consider only a 10 percent rate. 9 These include the United Kingdom (36 percent), Slovak Republic (26 percent), and Australia (39 percent). OECD (2008 OECD ( , 2011 there were 1.9 million VAT payers in 2010 when the threshold was generally $104,345 (£67,000). In addition, there are approximately 2.4 million unregistered enterprises that consist of self-employed individuals working alone or in partnership. 10 Thus, in total, there are approximately 4.5 million potential VAT paying businesses in the United Kingdom if an expansive defnition of a business is adopted. Of those 4.5 million businesses approximately 2.4 million were unregistered in the lowest taxable sales category of less than $77,859 (£50,000) per year in Figure 1 (United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2011). As described in the next section, information on the distribution of businesses by taxable sales provides a framework for evaluating a particular threshold as optimal. 
IV. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL SMALL BUSINESS THRESHOLD
Keen and Mintz recognize that the collection of VAT revenues is not costless since the government must bear administrative costs and businesses must bear compliance costs. These collection costs tend to be regressive, with costs (relative to sales) being higher for smaller businesses. In addition, collection costs often exceed the benefts of VAT collection from very small businesses. Intuitively, the VAT threshold should be set where the incremental beneft of tax revenue just offsets incremental collection costs.
In their simple model, Keen and Mintz assume that collecting VAT revenues from a given business costs authorities A in administrative costs. Similarly, each business faces compliance costs of Γ. Both these costs, A and Γ, are assumed to be fxed and independent of taxable sales. They assign δ > 1 to be the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF); this assumption states that a dollar in the hands of the government has greater social value than a dollar in the hands of private individuals. Potential VAT revenues depend on the tax rate, τ, as well as ν(z), the ratio of value added to sales at a given level of sales z. After setting up the policymaker's problem to choose the threshold z * such that it maximizes social welfare net of collections costs, the frst-order conditions can be rearranged to generate the decision rule
The optimal threshold is when the additional administrative and compliance costs in the numerator balance the social value of the additional VAT revenue gained.
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To illustrate use of this rule, Keen and Mintz use the estimates by Cnossen (1994) of $100 per business in administrative costs and $500 per business in compliance costs. Assuming a tax rate of 15 percent, a constant ratio of value added to sales of 35 percent, and a marginal cost of public funds of 1.3, the rule generates an optimal threshold of $40,000. Keen and Mintz extend their results in two ways. First, they calculate optimal VAT thresholds in the presence of an existing sales tax. Second, they model the frm's decision of whether or not to shrink in order to avoid the VAT.
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While Keen and Mintz simulate results for their model using a Cobb-Douglas production function calibrated to Canadian data, we instead examine how to apply their rule using actual micro-level data. Although Keen and Mintz predict there will likely be signifcant behavioral responses by frms, we start by considering a static analysis 11 Zee (2005) has an alternative model that focuses on consumption ineffciencies rather than production ineffciencies. As a result, the optimal threshold accounts for the elasticity of substitution in consumption, with the Keen and Mintz model being a special case. Zee further fnds that the Keen and Mintz model may overstate the optimal threshold. 12 Kim (2005) extends the Keen and Mintz model to account for tax evasion by VAT businesses.
of VAT thresholds in the United States and then expand the analysis to include some behavioral analysis.
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Since we use observational data in our analysis, we do not have a continuous functional form for ν(z). Rather, we have an empirical distribution where the relationship between value added and taxable sales is not straightforward. Even if we identify a candidate business that satisfes the condition for z * , it does not follow that all businesses with higher sales will also satisfy that condition.
14 Therefore we modify the decision rule described by Keen and Mintz to instead calculate, for each level s of taxable sales, the statistic
where VA s is the total value added for frms within that level of taxable sales, A s is the administrative cost for all frms at that level of sales, and Γ s is the compliance cost. We then pick our threshold (Z s ) to maximize the sum of these calculations for all businesses with z > Z s . We fnd the specifc value of this threshold, rounded for discursive purposes, by performing a grid search over each possible one-percentile band of taxable sales.
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This leads to a threshold that closely approximates one where marginal tax revenues just exceed the marginal administrative and compliance costs adjusted for the MCPF. This method is quite fexible; for example, it allows us to examine administrative and compliance cost functions that depend on business characteristics, as well as the ability to use actual frm micro-data.
Using this approach, the determinants of the threshold still affect the optimal value as we would expect. For a fxed distribution of value added and taxable sales, raising either the administrative costs or compliance costs will raise the threshold. Raising the tax rate lowers the threshold as does increasing the relative value of public funds.
V. DATA FOR A U.S. ANALYSIS A. Income Tax Data
Our analysis of the optimal VAT threshold in the United States relies primarily on income tax data for tax year 2007. 16 We identify the business entities liable for tax as 13 Keen and Mintz (2004) show that with a 10 percent tax rate the simple rule generates a $21,900 threshold.
Allowing for behavioral adjustments increases the threshold to $98,100 or $279,600, depending on the distribution of frms. 14 This is not a merely theoretical concern. For almost any level of taxable sales, we have both frms that satisfy the threshold decision rule and frms that violate the threshold decision rule. 15 Although it is possible for this approach to produce multiple optimal thresholds, in practice our distributions were relatively smooth, making the threshold choice unambiguous. 16 Note this means our estimates implicitly include the effect of non-compliance with respect to the existing income tax. Non-compliance may differ under the VAT.
well as the taxable sales and value added tax base for these businesses from the information appearing on income tax forms. 17 We include entities that fle one or more of the following business tax returns: Form 1040 Schedules C (nonfarm sole proprietor), E-Part I (rental real estate income), and F (farm sole proprietor), Form 4835 (farm rental income and expenses), Form 1065 (partnership), Form 1120 (C corporation), and Form 1120S (S corporation). 18 We treat each of these as a separate business liable for VAT taxes.
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This expansive defnition means we treat "labor suppliers" as separate businesses liable for VAT if they report "non-employee compensation" from the Form 1099-MISC on a business tax return as gross receipts.
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After choosing the entities to include in our analysis, we estimate taxable sales, purchases, and exports. We defne taxable sales as the sum of gross receipts, gross rents, gross royalties, fee income for depository institutions, and proceeds from the sale of used business property. We use Form 4797 for information on the gross sale price of business property. We defne purchases for this exercise as the items for which a business would receive VAT input credits. There is quite a bit of variation in the detail provided on purchases among the various tax forms. For most businesses, purchases include repairs and maintenance, bad debts, rents, advertising, other deductions, purchases of business property, and cost of goods sold less the embedded labor. Information on purchases of business property is from Form 4562 and is included instead of depreciation.
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VAT input credits accrue in the period that the purchase is made, whereas for income taxes, expenses are typically amortized to more closely match the timing of the recognition of the associated income. Other than the replacement of depreciation with purchases of business property, we do not correct the tax data for timing differences. Corrections of other timing differences would be diffcult and these other timing differences have a smaller impact on total purchases. 22 17 We obtain data from the samples drawn by Statistics Division of IRS from the population of flers for each of the legal forms of business included. 18 We consider a fled Schedule E a business only if it has entries for real estate income in Part I. Other parts of Schedule E contain income passed through from fow through entities that we have elsewhere treated as a business. 19 We treat multiple types of business entities reported by an individual as separate businesses. If an individual Form 1040 has more than one schedule attached to it, we just treat the two schedules with the largest turnovers as separate businesses. This treatment differs than that used by Knittel et al. (2011) . We also assume the corporate VAT return would be fled at the same level of consolidation as under the current income tax. 20 Knittel et al. (2011) note that excluding independent contractors from the defnition of a small business results in a signifcant reduction in the number of small businesses. Some of these flers are technically misclassifed employees while others are correctly treated as independent contractors. 21 For a detailed description of the types of issues in using tax data to estimate purchases and sales of capital, see Kitchen and Knittel (2011) . 22 For example, for the property and casualty insurance sector, we use earned premiums and losses incurred in our estimates, which matches income tax timing. For a VAT we would want premiums written and losses paid, but these are not readily available from tax returns.
B. The Estimation of Exports
VAT paid on inputs for exported goods and services are credited to the exporter under a destination-based VAT. Rather than estimating input credits, we arrive at the value added tax base for each business by simply reducing the estimated sales by an estimate of exports. There is no information about exports on the income tax return so we estimate exports based on information from the Input-Output Table of Table's Use and Make Tables we cre- ate a weighted export-to-gross-output ratio for each industry in the I-O Table. Industry is reported on each tax return so we are able to estimate exports for each business by applying the appropriate I-O industries export to gross output ratio to our measure of taxable sales for each business in that industry. 23 The treatment of wholesale and retail trade in the I-O Table poses a diffculty for the estimation of exports. Exports of commodities purchased for resale by the trade industries are not shown in the trade industries in the I-O Table but are instead shown exported from the producing industry. However, tax returns for the trade industry do include goods purchased for resale in both sales and cost of goods sold. We estimate exports for the trade industries by assuming that the difference between total exports in the I-O Table and exports estimated from tax returns for all industries other than trade is attributable to trade.
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Note the I-O Table essentially classifes establishments into industries, but we apply I-O Table ratios to companies. Corporations in particular are likely to have multiple establishments. In order to correct this industrial classifcation problem, we apply an establishment to company adjustment matrix supplied by BEA to both gross output and exports in order to adjust the export ratios obtained from the I-O Table to a company basis before applying them to corporate businesses.
We adjusted the export percentages to differ between small and medium enterprises ("SMEs") and large enterprises based on I-O Use Tables provided to us by the United States International Trade Commission ("USITC"). 25 We use this information to adjust our more detailed I-O Table results . In order to use the USITC I-O Tables, we must impute the number of employees for each of our businesses since this information is not available on the tax return. In particular, we must distinguish between large businesses with 500 or more employees and SMEs with fewer than 500 employees. We estimate the number of employees by dividing the labor compensation reported on the relevant tax schedule by total annual compensation per employee by industry.
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C. Description of the Database
Since there is almost no information reported on business income tax returns about the types of goods and services produced by the business, our database generally does not allow exclusions from the VAT base by type of product. Instead, we exclude from the tax base certain kinds of entities that typically produce sales that are not taxed under a VAT. For this analysis we exclude governments, non-proft organizations (even if they have commercial operations that would typically be taxed), many fnancial service providers (such as life insurance companies), and the output associated with owner-occupied housing.
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Under a credit-invoice VAT, input credits are allowed only for purchases from a taxable supplier. However, our data do not allow us to identify exempt purchases or exempt sales, including exempt purchases from businesses below the threshold. Therefore we treat all purchases as if they carried input credits. In this way, for purposes of measuring the VAT base for each business, we measure the base as a consumption subtraction VAT. To the extent that we allow credits for exempt goods, we underestimate VAT revenue. We are not able to identify exempt purchases from governments and non-proft businesses so we cannot measure the effect of allowing credits for these purchases on our estimate of the small business threshold. We do not apportion purchases of fnancial institutions between exempt and taxable sales and so underestimate the value-added base of such institutions. However, we do exclude fnancial fows, such as interest income and expense, from non-fnancial frms and thus do account for the impact of the fnancial services exemption on the tax base of such frms. A robustness analysis presented later in this paper suggests that our inability to identify exempt purchases from small businesses has a minimal effect on our calculation of the threshold. Table 2 shows the number of businesses, taxable sales, purchases, and value added grouped by legal form and by industry. In this table, purchases are defned to include purchased goods and services that carry input tax credits, purchased business property 26 The total annual compensation per employee by industry is from the 2007 Occupational Employment Statistics Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008) . Since this survey does not cover agricultural employees, information from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2007) is used. The resulting employee estimates are consistent with the Small Business Administration data on employment by industry and entity type. 27 Income tax data we have available for consolidated life insurance does not allow us to separate life and non-life activity so we exclude these businesses. Life consolidation with property/casualty insurance operations is typical. However, we do include Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and effectively connected income from foreign corporations. Table 3 . This table shows, within a decile, the distribution among legal forms of both the number of businesses and total sales. Schedule C and E flers together account for 75 percent of all business. The lower deciles are mostly populated by Schedule C, E, and F flers and partnerships, while the upper deciles are mostly populated by C and S corporations and partnerships. Schedule C, E, and F flers dominate the count of businesses, but C and S corporations and partnerships account for most of the taxable sales; together they account for 93 percent of sales. The top decile includes businesses with more than $228,000 in taxable sales and accounts for approximately 95 percent of total sales.
As shown in Tables 2 and 3 , a key characteristic of businesses in the United States that would be subject to a VAT is that a small number of businesses account for a large portion of the total sales. Figures 2 through 4 illustrate the degree to which some frms contribute disproportionately to both total sales and total value added. Figure 2 shows the number of businesses by level of taxable sales. There are about 1.6 million businesses (or a little more than 3 percent of all businesses) with sales of more than $1 million. At the other end of the distribution, there are approximately 36 million businesses (or 76 percent of all businesses) with taxable sales of less than $50,000. Figure 3 shows both the total sales and value added by taxable sales range. Panel A shows that businesses with more than $1 million in taxable sales account for approximately 89 percent of total sales, while businesses with less than $50,000 in taxable sales account for about 1.6 percent of total sales. Panel B shows that businesses with more than $1 million in taxable sales account for approximately 91 percent of the value added, whereas businesses with less than $50,000 in taxable sales in aggregate actually have negative value added.
If administrative and compliance costs are ignored and the threshold is based solely on the taxable sales level where tax revenue is positive, Panel B shows that the threshold would be approximately $20,000. 28 This is similar to the level chosen in many countries. Choosing $20,000 as the threshold in the United States would eliminate 29 million businesses from fling VAT returns and decrease refunds by approximately $30 billion because of the predominance of businesses with negative value added.
While Figure 3 shows the net value added in each size group, Figure 4 separates each of these net amounts into both positive and negative components. The positive portion for each size group is all frms with positive value added in that group, and the negative portion is all frms with negative value added in that group. Panel A shows the number of businesses in negative and positive value added position in each size group. There are about 12 million businesses (or almost 25 percent of all businesses) with less than Note: Asterisk denotes amounts less than $1 billion or percentages less than 1 percent.
$50,000 in taxable sales that have negative value added. While the largest frms contributed much of the negative value added, there are only around 200,000 frms above $1 million in taxable sales that had negative value added. Panel B separates the positive value added from the negative value added for each group. While the largest businesses contribute most of the positive value added, they also contribute more negative value added than the smallest businesses. The concepts we use for taxable sales, business property, exports, and value added are similar to National Income and Product Account (NIPA) concepts so it is natural to compare measures. Adjustments must be made to the NIPA measures to account for the sectors that are excluded from our estimates as well as for other identifable conceptual differences. Once these adjustments are made, the measures are generally comparable. Gross output from the 2007 I-O Table is is approximately $1.6 trillion as compared to our $1.7 trillion. Exports are the same $1.5 trillion for both measures because we targeted the NIPA measure. Finally, value added from the NIPA is $8.5 trillion compared to our measure of $6.6 trillion and labor compensation in the NIPA is approximately $6.5 trillion compared to our measure of $3.9 trillion. This difference is attributable to many conceptual, defnitional and statistical issues. For example, our tax data refect non-compliance, while data are corrected for non-compliance before inclusion in the NIPA. Our tax data are pre-audit while the NIPA corrects original tax submissions for post-audit adjustments.
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BEA uses the Quarterly Census for Employment and Wages from the BLS to measure labor compensation, whereas we use compensation as it appears on the tax form (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012). Finally, the adjustments we make to NIPA data, such as sectors that are excluded from our estimates and other identifable conceptual differences, are limited by source data availability.
D. Compliance Costs, Administrative Costs and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds
Obviously, there are no data for the United States on the compliance costs of a VAT, so we apply parameters estimated from overseas VAT collection experiences to frm-level data of U. S. businesses. Since compliance costs are regressive with respect to sales and may depend on frm characteristics, we use a compliance cost function that allows for costs to vary by taxable sales, industry, and whether a paid preparer is utilized. We use Swedish survey data of business compliance costs because Sweden has no VAT small business threshold and, like the United States, Sweden has both personal and corporate income taxes. Therefore, our estimate of compliance costs for a VAT based on Swedish data represents the additional compliance costs for the VAT given that there is an existing income tax.
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For simplicity, we assume that businesses either register and fle VAT returns, or do not register and do not fle.
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Under this method, aggregate VAT compliance costs would be approximately $40 billion per year if there is no small business threshold.
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Small businesses with taxable sales less than $50,000 have average 29 The BEA publishes tables that reconcile corporate profts appearing in the NIPA with net income appearing on the corporate tax return as well as nonfarm proprietors income appearing in the NIPA with nonfarm proprietors income appearing on the tax return. See BEA, NIPA, Tables 7.16 and 7.14, http://www.bea. gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 -reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=291. 30 See Appendix A in our related working paper (Brashares et al., 2013) for more details. We thank George Contos and John Guyton of the Internal Revenue Service's Research, Analysis, and Statistics who assisted us in developing the compliance cost estimates. They estimated the coeffcients for a VAT compliance cost function using Swedish VAT compliance cost survey data that we apply at the individual business level. We also thank Mats Andersson of Sweden's National Tax Board for sharing data with us on VAT compliance costs. 31 Registration and return fling may be separate activities in practice. In a small number of countries, businesses below the threshold do not need to collect VAT but must still register (OECD, 2011 On the other hand, businesses with taxable sales of $1 million or greater have average compliance costs per business of $3,900. These businesses account for 17 percent of compliance costs while making up only 3 percent of potential taxpayers and 79 percent of positive value added.
While administrative costs are usually expressed in aggregate as a percentage of GDP, we need to be able to assign administrative costs on a per-business basis. To that end, we estimate a frm's administrative costs as a proportional function of that frm's compliance costs. By using a proportional relationship, we allow for economies of scale in tax administration of large companies similar to the economies of scale in compliance. This proportional relationship enables us to vary administrative costs by business sales, industry, and the use of paid tax preparer similar to the way we vary compliance costs. We assume that the VAT would have a broad base and that reporting requirements would be comparable with existing U.S. taxes. We estimate the specifc relationship by taking the ratio of the overall IRS budget to the total cost of tax compliance in the United States, and arrive at a ratio of 10 percent.
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This results in estimated aggregate administrative costs of approximately $4 billion per year if there is no small business exemption level.
Because the marginal cost of public funds depends both on the country and tax being analyzed, the ideal MCPF for our use would be one that is measured for a VAT in the United States. However, this is not available. Estimates of the MCPF for other taxes in the United States and for other countries have a wide range.
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Following Keen and Mintz (2004) , we choose an estimate of 1.3. 36 Finally, we fx the tax rate, τ, to 10 percent and assume that a single rate would apply to all industries and products covered by the tax. The estimates of VAT collections shown in this paper should not be confused with revenue estimates. Revenue estimates account for non-compliance and other behavioral adjustments, including the assumption of a fxed GDP (Nester, 1987) .
VI. THE OPTIMAL U.S. THRESHOLD AND BUSINESS RESPONSE
A. The Optimal U.S. Threshold
Total sales and total value added are both concentrated at the top of the size distribution of businesses. At the bottom of the size distribution, there are many businesses with low or negative value added. A threshold set at a high level of taxable sales would signifcantly reduce the number of businesses that would be required to register for a 33 On a net basis, this group has an overall negative value added of $295 billion. 34 See Appendix A in our working paper for further discussion. 35 For example, see Kleven and Kreiner (2006) . 36 See Jones (2010) for a summary of MCPF estimates.
VAT, while having little impact on VAT revenues.
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In addition, tax authorities tend to spend signifcant resources examining frms that receive refunds compared to frms that are net taxpayers given problems with missing trader fraud schemes.
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Eliminating the very large number of businesses with little or negative value added at the lower end of the size distribution allows administrative resources to be focused on the upper end of the distribution where the payoff to careful examination is likely to be much higher. Figure 5 shows that the estimated threshold of $200,000 appears at the 90 th percentile of the distribution of U.S. businesses.
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The fgure focuses on the 60 th through 95 th percentiles of the size distribution of businesses by taxable sales. The bars show our test statistic from (2), the revenue collected net of administrative and compliance costs adjusted for the MCPF. The threshold is approximately where net revenues exceed zero. Approximately 43 million businesses are below the threshold, and 12.6 million of those have negative value added. The net value added below the threshold is -$145 billion so that at the 10 percent tax rate approximately $14 billion in refunds are saved by the government.
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The total reduction in administrative and compliance costs respectively are $2.6 billion and $25.5 billion. As expected based on preceding fgures and tables, most Schedule E, F, C flers and partnerships are below the threshold.
Because we cannot distinguish sales to registered businesses from sales to consumers and unregistered businesses, we measure VAT liabilities for each business as taxable sales less purchases, including those from exempt small businesses, multiplied by the tax rate. In reality the portion of the inputs purchased from exempt small businesses would be ineligible for an input tax credit. The effect that this has on the location of the threshold depends primarily on the overall magnitude of these non-creditable inputs and the location of the frms that purchase them in the size distribution of all frms.
We estimate the aggregate quantity of inputs ineligible for a credit by calculating that 4.3 percent of all output is produced by businesses below the threshold. We then assume that 4.3 percent of all purchases and investment would be ineligible for an input credit. If these inputs are distributed throughout the entire economy proportionally to use of inputs by each frm, then the VAT base for each frm falls slightly, in theory raising the 37 If frms below the threshold with negative value added do not fnd it worthwhile to register for the VAT, a high threshold could even raise VAT revenues. We discuss voluntary registration in Section VI.C.2. 38 Missing trader and carousel fraud occurs when a frm registers for the VAT, buys goods VAT free from another country, sells them with a VAT inclusive price, and then disappears without paying the VAT due. This sequence can be repeated, generating large VAT refunds. 39 Our threshold estimate is not very sensitive to the choice of administrative and compliance costs. We calculated the optimal threshold using alternative per business estimates of administrative costs of $100 and compliance costs of $1,000, and fnd the threshold would be approximately $170,000. These collections costs are based on Cnossen (1994) for a U.S. VAT. 40 We assume that the revenue for the entire value added by an exempt business is lost. However, it is possible some of that value added may have been taxed if the exempt business purchased intermediate inputs from a VAT registered business. Our working paper shows the distribution of the 89 percent of businesses below the $200,000 threshold by legal form and industry. threshold. However, the vast majority of inputs are purchased by businesses far above the threshold, and in practice the threshold does not move outside of the one-percentile band containing the $200,000 threshold. While this is not the only method we could use to distribute the non-creditable inputs, other approaches have little or no effect on the location of the threshold. Firms already above the threshold that use non-creditable inputs have no effect on the location of the threshold by construction. Firms below the threshold that use non-creditable inputs increase their VAT base and can potentially lower the threshold. However, since businesses above the threshold prefer inputs that are creditable, any attempt to lower the threshold is likely to result in the newly-taxed frms substituting away from exempt purchases and towards creditable purchases. This reduces their VAT base and moves the threshold back up to the original level. 41 We do not believe that purchases of the small amount of non-creditable inputs available from exempt small businesses are likely to signifcantly affect the location of the threshold.
B. Cross-National Comparison of Thresholds
The $200,000 threshold is larger than the thresholds for other countries that appear in Table 1 . There are several reasons for optimal thresholds to differ across countries. First, the characteristics of the VAT differ among countries (OECD, 2010) . The tax rate in particular has a profound impact on the threshold. Our $200,000 threshold is measured for a VAT with a single 10 percent rate, a broad base, and a single uniform threshold. A tax rate of 5 percent would result in a threshold of $600,000 in the United States, while a tax rate of 20 percent which would be more typical of the top rate for most countries in the sample would result in a threshold of $90,000. Column 3 of Table  1 shows the standard VAT rate for each country.
Second, two countries implementing the same VAT may still have different thresholds if the underlying economies are different. Even when the VAT rate and defnition of the base are the same in two countries, the optimal threshold would differ if either the size or industry distribution of frms differs. For instance, in the United States the optimal threshold for the agricultural industry by itself is almost $2 million, while the threshold for professional services by itself is a little over $100,000.
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Therefore if the economy were weighted more heavily in either of these two areas, the overall optimal threshold could change dramatically. Furthermore, specifc industries may differ across countries according to their level of value added relative to turnover. In countries where value added is high relative to turnover, the threshold will typically be lower than ours. 41 It is certainly possible to derive lower thresholds if certain frms are restricted from signifcantly changing their use of non-creditable inputs. However, we believe that a more realistic assumption is that frms above and below the threshold will generally arrive at an effcient allocation of creditable and non-creditable inputs. While businesses above the threshold may not be able to totally avoid purchases of non-creditable inputs, the volume of turnover and inputs below the $200,000 threshold suggest that most businesses below the threshold could sell to purchasers also below the threshold. 42 See Appendix B in our working paper for a table of U.S. thresholds by business form and industry.
Third, there is a difference between the optimal threshold that we measure and the "appropriate" threshold that would take into consideration political concerns. If two identical countries implement identical VATs, they may still pick different thresholds if their political goals are different. For instance, businesses below the threshold that sell to consumers may have a competitive advantage leading some to argue for a lower threshold than the one at which we arrive. This paper assumes that the goal is to maximize the real value of net tax collections, which incorporates the collection costs as well as the value of public funds but does not take into consideration any other political goals. As mentioned in Section V.C., if we were just concerned about net VAT revenues being positive and collection costs were not considered, the threshold would be around $20,000. This would place it frmly within the bottom range of thresholds in Table 1 .
C. The Response of Businesses to the Threshold
When a VAT includes a small business threshold, some businesses above the threshold may choose to produce less so that their level of taxable sales is below the threshold and they do not have to register and collect the VAT. Other businesses that are below the threshold may choose to voluntarily register and pay the VAT in order to gain certain benefts. Either of these responses can result from the rational maximization of aftertax profts.
43
In this section we describe the various incentives that businesses face to avoid or register for the VAT and how we model the response of businesses to these incentives. We also present estimates of the effects that these responses would have on VAT registration if all frms that could beneft from a threshold response do in fact respond. While we do not consider such a complete response to be likely, we model it as such in the spirit of providing an upper bound.
The Response of Firms Above the Threshold
Actual collection of VAT revenues may be smaller than desired due to avoidance of the VAT by intentional reductions in taxable sales. Taxing authorities frequently search for legislation that would reduce the incentives for such behavior. For example, Figure 6 , taken from Rauhanen and Venetoklis (2011) , shows the distribution of frms by taxable sales in Finland that are not registered for the VAT in 2003. At the level of taxable sales where the registration threshold occurs, $8,412 (8,500 €) per year, there is a bunching of frms with a steep fall off in the sales classes just below the threshold. This is consistent with the behavior of businesses that avoid registration for the VAT by decreasing or under-reporting their taxable sales.
We assume that a frm will reduce taxable sales to fall below the threshold when the cost of the VAT, relative to the frm's proft without the VAT, is larger than the reduc-4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 tion in taxable sales needed to fall below the threshold, relative to the business's sales without the VAT.
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Stated slightly differently, a business will reduce its taxable sales to fall below the threshold when it fnds that the savings in net VAT paid exceeds the lost profts from the reduction in sales. It is also possible that businesses above the threshold would split into multiple smaller businesses to effectively reduce their taxable sales. We assume that the United States, like other countries, would institute consolidation rules to prevent this behavior. Although the rules may not entirely eliminate splitting, we do not measure that behavior in this paper.
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Below we provide the intuition for our results.
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Firms more likely to move below the threshold share several characteristics. First, the closer a business is to the threshold, the more likely it is to engage in this behavior because the lost revenue is small relative to the cost of the VAT. Second, businesses with signifcant export sales are less likely to reduce their sales. As long as exports are zero rated, the business can claim a refund on the VAT paid on inputs. 47 Third, frms are more likely to move below the threshold if they are labor intensive. Firms that are more labor intensive have proportionately less taxable input than comparable frms with little or no labor input, and thus are eligible for fewer credits. Because they receive fewer input credits, their net cost of complying with the VAT is higher, and they have greater incentive to avoid it.
A fourth characteristic, which we unfortunately do not observe in the tax data, is the degree to which the business primarily sells to consumers. A retailer with taxable sales below the threshold would not have to pay VAT on the value added of the last (retail) stage. The tax "discount" may be retained by the retail business or passed on to the fnal consumer. However, a business that primarily sells to other businesses has reduced incentive to avoid the VAT. If there is a single market price for intermediate goods, a registered purchaser would prefer to buy inputs from another registered business since it will not receive input credits from an unregistered business. Thus businesses that sell to other businesses would be less likely to reduce sales to fall below the threshold.
After identifying frms that would beneft from decreasing taxable sales to avoid the VAT, we place them into one of three categories: those which are unproftable regardless of whether or not they are subject to the VAT, those which are unproftable only when subject to a VAT, and those which are proftable under a VAT. Table 4 shows 44 Because we assume frms have linear production functions, relative reductions in taxable sales correspond directly to relative reductions in proft. 45 For example, Onji (2009) looked at tax-motivated splitting with the introduction of the Japanese VAT in 1989. Japanese tax law anticipated and tried to prevent such "artifcial" splitting, for example by basing eligibility on the amount of sales consolidated with the divesting entity. However, Onji found the distribution of corporations changed with the imposition of the VAT such that there was a clustering of frms just below the threshold. 46 Appendix C in our working paper presents a more detailed derivation of our decision rules, which are based on businesses wanting to maximize after-tax profts. 47 Since our estimate of exports per business is imputed based on sales and relative size in each major industry, we do not capture the likely variability. This will in particular affect our estimate of the number of businesses voluntarily registering. estimates of the number of businesses that would potentially adjust sales to fall below the threshold, classifed by their percentile rank in the distribution of businesses and the reason for their behavior. The frst category covers businesses that have negative net income even when they are not required to collect the VAT and are referred to as the "In Loss" category.
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Many unproftable frms also have negative value added, meaning they would receive a net payment from the government. However, not all frms in a loss position have negative value added, and some frms have compliance costs that exceed their VAT refund. For these businesses, the reduction of domestic sales to fall below the threshold lowers their total losses. These in loss businesses make up 7 percent of businesses above the threshold and account for approximately $15 billion of the VAT revenue.
The second category, referred to as the "High Labor Cost" category, includes the approximately 3 percent of businesses that are proftable when they do not need to collect the VAT, but become unproftable when they do. This category includes the businesses with high value added stemming from high labor costs. These frms are unlike the frms in a loss position, because if businesses in this group are able to avoid the VAT, they regain their proftability.
The third category of businesses, the "Proftable Responders" category, includes those businesses that are proftable whether or not they are subject to the VAT, but nonetheless choose to reduce taxable sales. They choose to reduce sales both because they are relatively close to the threshold and because their VAT burden, both the tax and compliance costs, are relatively high. This category accounts for 8 percent of businesses above the threshold and 2 percent of the VAT. In particular, those close to the threshold that adjust their behavior make up 6 percent of businesses above the threshold but 38 percent of businesses in the 90 th percentile above the threshold. These businesses account for less than 1 percent of the VAT burden above the threshold but 57 percent of the 90 th percentile above the threshold. Moving away from the threshold, the percentage of proftable responders rapidly decreases such that by the 94 th percentile they are less than 5 percent of businesses and account for less than 8 percent of the VAT.
In all, of the 5.2 million businesses above the threshold, 18 percent could potentially adjust to fall below the threshold. Figure 7 shows the percentage of businesses in each percentile that would potentially reduce domestic sales to fall below the threshold by each of the categories described above.
The Response of Firms Below the Threshold
There are also businesses below the threshold and otherwise untaxed by the VAT that have an incentive to voluntarily register for the VAT. We divide these businesses 48 Net income used in our estimates of the response to the small business threshold is the tax return measure of net income before net operating losses and before income taxes. We do not know if these frms are always in a loss position, or if they are only unproftable for the current year. Because we have only one year of data, we model them as if this is their permanent state. Percent of Percentile into two groups: those with a negative VAT base, and those with growth potential that would make it advantageous to register. The frst group includes businesses with a "Negative VAT Base" that have an incentive to register. These businesses have a potential VAT refund that exceeds the compliance costs that they would incur if they were to register. However this category does not include businesses with VAT refunds that are less than their compliance costs.
Our second group of businesses, "Proftable Registrants," will register if doing so provides an advantage to them as a supplier of goods and services. As discussed in more detail in Bird and Gendron (2007) , the response of businesses with a positive VAT base depends on how much the marketplace values inputs from taxed frms relative to untaxed frms. Registered businesses would generally prefer to purchase inputs from registered frms because those purchases convey input credits, and thus lower the purchaser's VAT liability. This implies that a frm below the threshold may be able to increase demand for its products, relative to similar products sold by unregistered businesses, by registering for the VAT. We do not have enough information to predict how much a business's taxable sales would increase as a result of voluntary registration. However, we can calculate a statistic that indicates how much demand must grow to induce a frm to register.
The assumption underlying the statistic is that a business will voluntarily register when it expects registration to result in an increased demand for its products that will increase after-tax profts. These frms must weigh the potential gains in proft against the cost of collecting the VAT and bearing compliance costs. The overall cost to the frm of registering for the VAT will depend primarily on the tax rate, compliance costs, and the degree to which labor is used in the production process.
The growth rate in demand resulting from registration must exceed 11 percent before a signifcant number of businesses would voluntarily register. The similarity between this growth rate and the tax rate is not a coincidence. For a frm with no labor costs, no exports, and small compliance costs, the growth rate in demand must be at least as large as the new tax rate in order to encourage registration. The only frms that respond to a growth rate in demand below the tax rate are exporters with low labor and compliance costs who are rare in our sample. We present the effects of a 12 percent growth in demand to identify likely responders in the following tables.
49 Table 5 shows the number of businesses that will voluntarily register and the impact on VAT revenues classifed by both the reason for voluntary registration and percentile rank. Of the approximately 43 million businesses below the threshold, eight million have a negative VAT base and would be candidates to register and receive a refund. This group accounts for $62 billion of VAT refunds. We fnd that exports play a small role in determining whether or not businesses receive VAT refunds. This may be due to our imputation methods. However, purchases of capital goods are a major driver of refunds. The bottom percentiles of taxable sales, ranging from $0 to $18, includes a large number 49 A sensitivity analysis of our choice of growth rate is included in our working paper.
Table 5
Number of Businesses and VAT Revenue of of businesses eligible for a VAT refund. Approximately 2.9 million of the 4.3 million businesses in this range have a negative VAT base, and they account for VAT refunds of $22 billion. Because of fraud and administrative cost concerns, countries may only provide VAT refunds over a certain threshold and may also have requirements to limit voluntary registration such that our lowest percentiles would likely be excluded from registering.
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We expect that the United States would have similar rules. If so, we are overstating how many businesses could voluntarily register to receive VAT refunds at the very low sales levels.
In Table 5 , we also show the number of frms, so called "Proftable Registrants," that would voluntarily register by percentile ranking if, once they voluntarily registered, they expected demand for their products would grow at 12 percent. Under these circumstances, 2 million businesses would fnd it advantageous to register. As shown in Figure 8 , this group starts at approximately the 60 th percentile and increases until the threshold. Approximately 2 million proftable registrants account for $14 billion in VAT revenue as shown in Table 5 .
Overall, we expect that at least 8 million businesses below the threshold will voluntarily register. These businesses account for 23 percent of all businesses below the threshold and would lower VAT revenues by approximately $48 billion. Figure 9 shows the percentage of businesses in each taxable sales percentile that would register for the VAT, both with and without taking into account their likely behavioral response. The solid line represents the percentage of registrants, absent any behavioral responses. The bars show the percentage of each taxable sales percentile that would likely register, accounting for the behavioral responses described above. Most of the voluntary registrations in the smaller taxable sales percentiles are by businesses eligible for VAT refunds. Moving towards the threshold, the proportion of businesses opting to voluntarily register increases and becomes mostly composed of businesses responding to potential demand growth resulting from registration. Above the threshold, businesses respond by lowering supplies in order to fall below the threshold. As described previously, this group is made up of those with losses, high labor costs, and for whom the benefts of adjusting are high relative to the costs.
VAT Registrations After Business Response to the Threshold
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we use a database of tax returns developed by Knittel et al. (2011) and the theoretical framework developed by Keen and Mintz (2004) to determine the static optimal threshold for a VAT in the United States when the VAT rate is 10 percent. We believe this is the frst published measure of an optimal threshold for the United States based on individual frm data.
The micro-data allow us to describe the types of businesses that would fall below the optimal threshold both by legal form and by industry. These data also allow us to estimate the response of businesses to the threshold. Relying on after-tax proft maximization behavior, we develop methods to determine which frms will voluntarily decrease sales to move below the threshold and which frms will voluntarily register despite being below the threshold.
We estimate the optimal threshold for a 10 percent VAT to be $200,000. This threshold would reduce the number of businesses required to register for a VAT by 89 percent or by some 43 million businesses. Most of these businesses are small non-corporate flers, the largest number being Schedule E flers in the Real Estate industry. Absent voluntary registration, the threshold would also increase net VAT revenues by 4 percent (to $353 billion) since many of the frms below the threshold would otherwise receive refunds. We also explore reasons why this threshold differs from those used in other countries.
We estimate that almost 1 million businesses have an incentive to reduce their taxable sales in order to fall under the threshold, causing VAT revenue to decline by $31 billion. We categorize these businesses according to their proftability with and without the costs of the VAT. Below the threshold, we estimate at least eight million businesses would likely voluntarily register for the VAT, resulting in VAT revenues declining by approximately $48 billion. While we fnd that some proftable businesses will register if it results in an increase in demand for their products, most of those that will voluntarily register are businesses with negative VAT bases.
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